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ABSTRACT 
Singapore has a positive reputation with multinational corporations for its stable, corrupt-
free investment environment and for the efficiency of its industrial infrastructure, positive 
attributes typically lacking in Asia’s emerging economies. The idea of "exporting its 
expertise" in infrastructure development took hold, in the early 1990s, as part of a larger 
regionalization strategy. Under this strategy, Singapore has established industrial parks in 
China, India and several Southeast Asian countries, in each case led by government-
linked companies. Their progress is a litmus test of Singapore’s ability to export its 
efficiency in industrial park development and management outside its borders. This paper 
concludes that the initial optimism with which the projects were unveiled has not been 
justified. 
 




 “Going regional is, therefore, about investing our expertise and capabilities in other growth 
areas in the region, interlocking them with our domestic economy. It is to strengthen our domestic 
economy, expand our national economic zone, and ratchet up our standard of living. This is the 
mission of our regionalization drive.”  
 - Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong (Singapore Forum Proceedings, 1993) 
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This landmark speech by Singapore's Prime Minister Goh enunciated the new focus in Singapore’s 
economic development.  The development of overseas industrial parks is the main thrust of Singapore’s 
regionalization drive, which provides a key component of the strategy for strengthening the island's 
economy. Singapore's policymakers have great faith in the regional parks' success due to Singapore's 
connections to both multinational corporations (MNCs), established from the onset of the city-state's 
modern economic development, as well as guanxi, or connections, to Asian business networks (Kraar, 
1996; Yeung, 1997). The inter-governmental projects were intended to result in privileged foreign 
investment zones but, as will be discussed below, inadvertently exposed the parks to particular 
dependencies and challenges.  
 
To provide the context to this paper, a brief account of Singapore’s regionalization initiative is presented, 
followed by an update of Singapore's industrial parks in China and Vietnam, and the surrounding 
regulation and investment flows affecting the viability of these projects. The case study parks are then 
evaluated in terms of their progress in attracting investment, their contribution to the strategic objectives 
associated with the individual park as well as to the Singapore’s broader regionalization initiative. The 
final part of the paper considers the implications of these experiences for the future of Singapore’s 
regionalization program. 
 
REGIONALIZATION & THE SINGAPORE ECONOMY 
 
Since mid-1960s, the Singapore government has been wooing foreign MNCs with incentives to fuel 
Singapore's economic development. By the mid-1980s, rising business costs meant that it was imperative 
for the country to shift from labor-intensive activities towards higher value-added ones to realise its vision 
of becoming a regional centre of advanced technology (Lim, 1984). Singapore’s economic planners 
sought to expand the island's investment horizons through an overseas direct investment program 
launched in 1988. This program sought to accelerate access to new technology, or foreign markets, by 
supporting Singapore companies to form joint ventures with overseas companies in Europe and North 
America (Caplen and Ng, 1990). Over S$1.2 billion was invested in North America during 1989-1991, 
with a significant proportion of this being linked to the investments of Singapore’s GLCs. Most of these 
investments proved unsuccessful, resulting in enormous accumulated losses by the early 1990s 
(Balakrishnan, 1991; Kanai, 1993).  A new phase in the internationalisation strategy re-focused on 
expansion within Asia. The change from internationalisation to regionalization was rationalised by the 
liberalisation of foreign investment controls occurring at the time in countries like Indonesia and China, 
and the subsequent high growth rates these economies were achieving (Perry, 1995; Kraar, 1996; Kwok, 
1996; Yeung, 1998). In 1993, the change from internationalization to regionalization was endorsed by the 
Committee to Promote Enterprise Overseas (Singapore Ministry of Finance, 1993).  
 
The regionalization strategy comprised state-led infrastructure projects and a range of incentives and 
regulatory innovations designed to assist private companies and individuals move overseas (Singapore 
Economic Development Board, 1995). The Government also initiated a series of platforms for strategic 
discussions and collaboration to market Singapore’s overseas industrial parks. 
 
The support for government leadership had been further encouraged by the success in establishing 
Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP), the first overseas industrial township developed by Singapore. 
Development of BIP commenced in 1990 on the nearby Indonesian island of Batam. It subsequently 
became the model for other townships subsequently developed under the regionalization program (Asian 
Review, 1996; Yeung, 1998; Grundy-Warr et al., 1999; Perry and Yeoh, 2000). As well as BIP's 
successful start, industrial township development appealed as it offered a direct role in the regionalization 
program for GLCs, as well as opportunities for small scale services such as transport firms, medical 
centres, etc, to support the projects (Tan, 1995). The program further boosted when the then-Chinese 
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premier Deng Xiaoping invited Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew to develop a model industrial 
township to test the ability to transplant Singapore's methods to China. The project invitation envisaged 
both infrastructure provision, and the transfer of 'software' associated with Singapore’s social and 
economic policies, endorsing the perception of Singapore’s policy makers that it could market its 
reputation for efficient, non-corrupt administration. 
 
Precise objectives for the regionalization program have not been made public, but it is clear that the 
starting ambition was large. In 1994 it was announced that 2-3 percent of the republic’s resources would 
be directed to infrastructural projects in Asia but, after 10-15 years, this share could grow to 30-35 
percent (Kwok, 1996). The strategic intent is to facilitate Singapore’s transition to a ‘total business centre’ 
by facilitating the moving out of low value manufacturing and the restructuring of the economy into high 
value manufacturing, and regional co-ordination activities for foreign and indigenous multinationals. As 
well, and perhaps the ultimate test of the parks is that they elevate Singapore as a role model in the region 
and a source of diplomatic leverage with more populous nations. 
 
THE CHINESE PARKS 
 
In physical design, the two main industrial townships that are under development in China, at Suzhou and 
Wuxi, follow the pattern of BIP. The administrative context, on the other hand, is different. In the BIP 
model, the Indonesian partner is a private company whereas in China, the Singapore investors work with 
government agencies. Another difference is the complexity of the administrative and regularity 
environment in China compared with Indonesia. In Indonesia’s highly centralised political system, the 
endorsement from senior national politicians has provided a degree of administrative certainty further 
strengthened by the political protection of the main commercial partner in the projects. In China, the 
projects must contend with multiple tiers of government administration and the competition between 
these tiers during a time of economic and political change. The motivation for the projects in China is also 
more diffused than in the case of Indonesia. In the latter case, the primarily concern has been to promote 
the restructuring of the Singapore economy and exploit the complementarity of neighbouring economies. 
The Suzhou project has had a political objective to demonstrate the strength of the ‘Singapore 
development model’ and its transferability to other Asian environments. Wuxi has narrower objectives 
based on the perception that Singapore agencies have an advantage in real estate development in China 
because of their links to western business, and access to Chinese business (and political) networks. 
 
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CS-SIP) 
 
CS-SIP is Singapore's most controversial overseas township project and China's largest joint venture 
measured both in its total estimated project cost (US$20 billion) and land size (70km2). CS-SIP was 
conceived as a balanced community, home to a workforce of 360,000 and a total population of 600,000. 
As well as providing the full range of urban facilities for its resident population of workers, managers, 
administrators, expatriates and their families, it was also to be the new commercial centre for the existing 
city of Suzhou as well as a commercial centre serving the surrounding area. The ambition for CS-SIP 
reflected the goal of developing a township on a scale to test in China the effectiveness of the Singapore 
approach to social and economic development. This goal was encouraged by China’s former premier 
Deng Xiaoping who, it has been said, regarded Singapore as ‘a capitalist version of the communist 
dream’. In 1992, Deng promoted the idea of learning from Singapore as a way of avoiding the 
environment problems and social disorder that concerned him in southern China. Singapore’s Senior 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew took up this message, and personally took charge of the formalisation of the idea 
into the development of CS-SIP (Cartier, 1995). The development of CS-SIP was sanctioned by the State 
Council on February 11, 1994 and three landmark agreements were signed in Beijing on February 26, 
1994. The Park was formally launched on May 12, 1994.  
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The Singapore model, as applied to CS-SIP, encompasses methods for attracting and developing the 
commitment of foreign companies1. It also involves the delivery of social and welfare services to support 
an efficient and co-operative workforce and a work-orientated community. Attributes thought to attain 
these conditions include welfare provision (encompassing housing, medical and retirement needs) self-
funded through compulsory employee and employer contributions, high quality infrastructure, strict 
pollution control, service reliability, ‘one stop’ non-corrupt decision-making, minimum entry or 
performance regulation and transparent financial charges. To bring these attributes to CS-SIP required a 
large-scale project to facilitate institutional innovation, autonomy from aspects of local government 
control and investment in administrative practice or, as it has become known, ‘software development’ 
(Cartier, 1995; SIPAC, 1998).  
 
CS-SIP was developed by a joint venture between a consortium of Chinese and Singapore-based investors 
known as the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development Company (CSSD). The Chinese 
consortium has a 35 percent stake in CSSD shared amongst 12 organizations, mainly national state-owned 
enterprises together with Suzhou city and Jiangsu province (in which Suzhou is located) investment 
companies. The Singapore consortium has a 65 percent stake in CSSD shared amongst 24 organizations, 
mainly Singapore government-linked agencies and companies, including EDB Investment and JTC 
International, as well as two organizations that also participated in other parks - SembCorp Industries and 
the Salim Group (through a subsidiary, KMP China Investments). The two consortia retain their separate 
identity and responsibilities with projects taken up by participants according to their expertise and agreed 
roles. The work of CSSD is overseen by a specially created local authority, the Suzhou Industrial Park 
Administrative Committee (SIPAC). Inter-governmental interest remains through a joint steering council 
co-chaired China’s Vice-premier Li Lanqing and Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. 
 
CS-SIP was launched amidst great fanfare. Singapore’s optimism about the project was encouraged by a 
series of advantages secured at the outset of the project. CS-SIP is located in Jiangsu province, which was 
selected in the early 1990s for accelerated economic development to offset the concentration of foreign 
investment in the SEZs (Yang, 1997). The township was afforded preferential policies, comparable to 
those in China’s Special Economic Zones. Finally, its unique status as an inter-governmental 
development initiative was believed to add security against the political risks of investing in China.  
 
Since the inception of CS-SIP, limits to each of the advantages obtained have become apparent. The 
significance of the inter-governmental endorsement of the project has been reduced by the influence that 
municipal and provincial administrators have over the project and their interest in competing projects. 
The special status of CS-SIP was reflected in the creation of a new local government authority (SIPAC) to 
administer the development, but the impact of the investment incentives allocated to SIPAC were diluted 
by their replication amongst other development zones in the province. Moreover, a concession granted to 
SIPAC enabling it to retain all development revenue during its first ten years has been a reason for local 
administrators to favour projects providing revenue to the municipality. This competition is heightened by 
CS-SIP being the second industrial zone to open for foreign investment within the Suzhou municipality. 
The Suzhou New District commenced earlier, and it continues to be favoured for commercial and housing 
development as well as by foreign investors (The Straits Times, May 14, 1999). The New District is a 
project affiliated to the Suzhou municipal government and similar to CS-SIP. As well as its established 
presence, the New District has the further advantage of being located to the west of the existing city of 
Suzhou, with lower land development costs and greater proximity to Suzhou’s airport.  
 
                                                         
1
 The then Suzhou Mayor, Zhang Xin Sheng, readily acknowledges that Suzhou is borrowing Singapore’s credibility 
with multinationals, and it’s management skills “so that a latecomer can catch up” (cited in Kraar, 1996:4). 
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There has also been difficulty in retaining the software advantages within CS-SIP. Administrative 
distinctiveness has been weakened by the diffusion of practices to other industrial zones. Thus the ‘one 
stop service’ has been replicated in the Suzhou New District, which now claims to match CS-SIP's 
capacity for rapid decision making, including the ability to process business licence applications in 10 
working days. Moreover, the province’s wealth means that it has comparatively high standards of 
infrastructure and environmental control. This reduces the scope for CS-SIP to differentiate itself through 
its physical design and management as was achieved in Indonesia. 
 
By mid-1998, it was claimed that projects with a total potential value of US$3.4 billion had been 
attracted, including 88 manufacturing operations with an average project value of US$30 million. While 
the value of manufacturing investment has been close to target, the overall rate of progress of the project 
has not met Singapore’s expectations especially with respect to residential and commercial development. 
The extent of Singapore’s disappointment is indicated by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s public 
questioning of the commitment of the Chinese partners to the project (The Straits Times, 5 December 
1997). Singapore’s frustration has been greatest over the limited progress of housing and commercial 
projects. At the end of 1998, there were only around 1,000 residents in the township and a total workforce 
of 6,000. The slow rate of development represents a financial loss to the Singapore consortium, which has 
principally funded the initial land development and infrastructure facilities. As well, there are costs faced 
by Singaporean investors in executive housing, retail and other services that were encouraged to set up in 
the township in expectations of the project’s rapid development. Singaporean investors reportedly lost 
US$77 million over seven years of operations. Significantly, there is also a political cost in the suggestion 
that Singapore was naive in perceiving that it would obtain a special status in China (The Economist, 
January 3, 1998). 
  
The Asia financial crisis has provided a context where withdrawal has become easier to justify, and in 
June 1999, it was announced that Singapore would reduce its involvement in the project and transfer 
majority ownership of CSSD to the Chinese consortium from 2001 (The Straits Times, June 30, 1999). 
CS-SIP had, by then, attracted 133 projects. More than 91 international firms had started operations and 
14,000 jobs created. These investments have provided a basis from which the township should grow. In 
January 2001, the Singapore consortium reduced its stake in CS-SIP to 35%. 
 
Interestingly, investments began to pour in thereafter, with profits of US$7.5 million expected in 2001, 
the first time since the Park’s inception (The Straits Times, January 19, 2001). CSSD recorded a profit of 
US$7.5 million at year end.  By June 2001, the Park had attracted 193 investment projects worth over 
US$5.1 billion. Growth continues into 2002, with contracted investments reaching US $13.2 billion, with 
3 investment projects surpassing US$1 billion each. The Park has since become a foreign investment hub 
linked to Fortune 500 companies. CSSD has plans to be listed by 2004 as well as to build an international 
standards high-tech park. Plans are in the pipeline for the completion of the second and third phase of the 
transportation network and other infrastructure developments within the Park. 
 
CS-SIP has experienced greater development challenges than anticipated at the project’s outset, but the 
value of industrial investment attracted has provided a basis from which the township can grow. The 
profile of investment indicates that CS-SIP has attracted comparatively high value projects, and that it has 
attracted a relatively high proportion of American and European investors. This suggests that the 
Singapore involvement has carried some weight with those investors that are most at risk from 
administrative uncertainties, but it is against the larger diplomatic objectives pursued by the Singapore 
government that CS-SIP will ultimately be judged..  
 
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park (WSIP) 
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WSIP was instigated purely as a real estate development with the potential to cover up to 10 km2 also 
making it a smaller project than CS-SIP. The Park is located in the Jiangsu Province, 130 km away from 
Shanghai and 80 km northwest of Suzhou. The Park was been designated a national high technology 
development zone. This status defines WSIP’s marketing focus, viz, electronics and electrical, computer 
and computer peripherals, control systems and instrumentation, precision engineering, 
telecommunications components, medical and healthcare products, and automotive and aerospace 
components 
  
WSIP markets itself based on its strategic location, quality service in management, as well as first-rate 
infrastructure, telecommunications and transportation networks. WSIP started as 70 percent Singapore-
owned joint venture with the remaining 30 percent taken up by Wuxi’s municipal government. The 
Singapore consortium is led by SembCorp Industries (SCI), with the other principal investors being 
Temasek Holdings (the Singapore government’s main investment holding company) and the Salim/KMP 
Group. Wuxi municipal authority has interests in other industrial estates2, but Singapore officials say 
these are not direct competitors as only WSIP is designed exclusively for wholly foreign-owned ventures. 
Moreover, in contrast to Suzhou, Wuxi municipality is the sole Chinese partner involved in the project 
compared with the multiple parties involved in CS-SIP.  Lower land costs are a further advantage over 
CS-SIP. Unlike CS-SIP, WSIP was negotiated directly with the Wuxi authorities, and this direct 
involvement has minimized the polarization between the higher echelons of Chinese government and the 
provincial government.  
 
WSIP was designed for wholly foreign-owned investment and, like CS-SIP, there has been an emphasis 
on instigating a ‘one stop’ administrative service to manage approvals and documentation in setting up a 
new enterprise. The park is on the edge of Wuxi’s urban district, but has been designed with its own 
service facilities, dormitory accommodation and executive village. Development of WSIP commenced in 
1994, and the administration building officially opened in 1996. WSIP’s key investors are mainly MNCs 
with operations in Singapore, including Siemens Components, Seagate Technology, Sumitomo Electric 
and Matsushita Refrigeration. The assistance from Singapore’s Economic Development Board in bringing 
the first tenants to the Park is acknowledged. The total investment attracted has, nonetheless, been below 
that attracted to CS-SIP. The investment profile is relatively low value-added, with a large share of Asian 
investments. 
  
From a total of US$450 million investment committed in 1996 and 6,000 jobs at the end of 1996, investor 
interest has slowed. Exports from WSIP were valued at US$1 billion in 2001, and employment stood at 
16,000. WSIP has been developed to its second phase, covering an area of 235 hectares. However, WSIP 
has yet to attain to achieve economic viability. The Park has been operating at a loss since: WSIP incurred 
losses of S$3.8 million and S$4.3 million in 1998 and 1999, respectively, and only managed to trim its 
losses to S$2.8 million in 2000. In mid-2002, the SCI-led consortium signed an agreement to pare its 
stake in the loss-making WSIP. The transfer of shareholding and management control would, according 
SCI officials, result in better “alignment of interests and improve the operating efficiency of the park” 
(The Straits Times, May 14, 2002). SCI has provided for an extraordinary loss of S$48.3 million for its 
loans to the Park, and will reduce its stake from 70 percent to 49 percent from 2003. SCI also expressed 
its ultimate interest in divesting its entire interest in WSIP, which it considers to be its `non-core 
business’. 
 
Interestingly, like CS-SIP, the Chinese partners have recently announced plans to develop the third phase 
of the project, which will double the Park’s size. It is envisaged that, by granting the Chinese a larger 
                                                         
2
 For example, the One Zone-Five Parks-One College initiative (which includes the Wuxi Software Park, Science & 
Technology Industrial Park, Machinery & Electronics Industrial Park, Huayang Science & Technology Park, and 
Wuxi Information Technology College) as well as Wuxi University Science & Technology Park. 
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interest in WSIP, the Park’s performance will turn around in 2002. Suffice to say, even though WSIP has 
not experienced serious administrative difficulties with the local bureaucracy, the handing over to Chinese 
management mirrors the outcome of CS-SIP. 
  
VIETNAM-SINGAPORE INDUSTRIAL PARK 
 
The Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP) is Singapore’s flagship investment project in Vietnam. 
The lessons learned from the Chinese parks are put to play in VSIP. To prevent the difficulties 
encountered in the Suzhou `experiment’, greater care has been taken to foster stronger collaboration with 
local authorities. A consortium led by Singapore’s SembCorp Industries3, and Becamex, a state-owned 
enterprise of the Binh Duong Province People's Committee, was formed to spearhead the project. 
Becamex holds a 49 percent stake in the project. In addition, a Management Board4 was set up, chaired by 
the Vice Chairman of the Binh Duong Province People's Committee to ensure greater participation by the 
local authorities, and to pre-empt VSIP from being perceived as a partnership forced upon by the central 
government  
 
The 1000-hectare Park is located in Binh Duong Province, 17 km north of Ho Chi Minh city. The 
Singapore-styled industrial park concept was replicated in VSIP. A self-contained park with ready-built 
factories, as well as Singapore-style management expertise and infrastructure support, VSIP provides a 
`hassle-free’, one-stop service to it tenants. VSIP boasts an on-site customs unit, which allows customs 
procedures and documentation to be done within the Park, as well as customs inspections within tenant’s 
factories. A working population of 200,000  within a 15-km radius from the Park ensures a ready pool of 
low-cost labor. 
 
Prior to its launch in May 1995, a total of 13 international companies with investments worth US$80 
million reportedly indicated their interest in VSIP (Asian Review, 1996). The role of Singapore’s EDB is 
acknowledged. By end-1998, VSIP attracted US$370 million in investments and 27 manufacturing 
tenants, and despite the difficult environment post-1997, cumulative investment commitments topped 
US$400 million from 33 companies in 1999. To-date, the Park has attracted over US$500 million in 
investments from 64 tenants, of which 53 are operating tenants. Most of the tenants are from Singapore 
(15), Japan (13), and Taiwan (12), reflecting the importance of Asian MNCs in the Park’s tenant mix. The 
sector mix range from textiles, to electronics and pharmaceuticals. 
 
Despite initial optimism over VSIP, profits have yet to be realised. This is largely due to competition 
from several neighboring industrial parks, some of which are located next to VSIP. These newer, albeit 
smaller, industrial parks may not match the infrastructure and facilities provided by VSIP, but they 
compete on price, charging only a fraction of VSIP’s `packaged’ fees. The Park initially relied on its 
excellent infrastructural facilities and support services to hold on to its tenants. However, tight market 
conditions have forced some VSIP tenants to seek cheaper alternatives. Industrial-park developers from 
Japan, Taiwan and Korea, experienced and street-savvy, have given VSIP cause for concern. 
 
The ‘special’ support from the local authorities also proved to be less significant than initially thought. 
Iimprovements on infrastructural projects have translated into higher toll charges and miscellaneous fees, 
all of which, added to the tenants’ operating costs. Added to these, local resentment over Singapore’s 
                                                         
3
 Other members of the consortium include Temasek Holdings, JTC International, UOL Overseas Investments, 
Salim’s KMP Group, LKN Construction, and MC Development Asia. 
 
4
 The Board, with representatives from the Ministries of Trade, Finance and Interior, as well as the General Customs 
Department oversees the issue of investment licenses, import/export permits, and construction permits.  
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`control’ and management of VSIP have surfaced (source: on-site interviews with VSIP interviews and 
tenants, August 2002). Anecdotal evidence suggests that VSIP may face similar problems as in CS-SIP. 
 
On a broader front, bureaucratic red-tape and corruption remain endemic. There is some way to go in the 
transition from mainly state-run to privately managed conditions. Transparency International, a global 
counter-corruption watchdog, ranks Vietnam as the second most corrupt country in South-East Asia. The 
Vietnamese government itself recently estimated that light-fingered bureaucrats creamed off at least 20% 
of the infrastructure spending (The Economist, September 14, 2002). On a positive note, the government 
has reportedly taken measures5 to reduce avenues for corruption, and the 2001 Business Risk Consultancy 





In Asia’s rapidly growing economies, infrastructure can be unreliable and administration subject to 
corruption (Hatch and Yamamura, 1998). Foreign investment is invariably drawn to investment enclaves 
that provide privileged access to international trade, principally export processing zones (Chen, 1995), as 
well as in and around centres of international infrastructure which generally means capital cities. 
Singapore’s overseas parks are configured to exploit the emerging production networks. This context 
provides opportunity for Singapore-developed parks through the provision of superior infrastructure and 
the ability to negotiate investment concessions6. Influence can be exerted through inter-governmental 
interaction and, where existing, through the links to influential Chinese business groups in the investment 
location who often rely on state patronage for their access to infrastructure development projects.  
 
The progress of Singapore’s overseas parks over a comparatively short period of time indicates the ability 
of the city-state to mobilise economic and political resources. Singapore has developed an area equivalent 
to 20 percent of the industrial land area managed by the state’s industrial land developer within Singapore 
through these flagship projects. Nonetheless, as most openly admitted, substantial challenges remain to 
securing the long-term financial viability of the remaining R2000 projects, and in achieving the larger 
goals set for the regionalization program.  
 
In the case of China, the projects were expected to benefit from the ability of Singapore’s Chinese elites 
to obtain a special status through their ethnic allegiance and dual connections to overseas Chinese and 
western business networks. The Suzhou-Wuxi experience suggests that, while there is an interest in 
learning from Singapore, local officials wish to deal directly with foreign investors. This outcome accords 
with the assessment of observers that China tends increasingly not to view overseas Chinese as preferred 
investors, or joint venture partners (Harding, 1995). In the case of Vietnam, the fact that the Park has 
failed to show profit, by itself, should not be interpreted as a failure of Singapore's regionalization efforts. 
Whereas the Chinese parks shows Singapore's courtship with China, VSIP is part of Singapore's  efforts 
to engage its ASEAN partners.  
 
For the Chinese projects, but less obvious for the Vietnam project, the reliance on personal ties rather than 
transparent contracts has had advantages and disadvantages. In the Suzhou-Wuxi experiment, the limits of 
relying on personal ties have been most immediately encountered, where inter-government endorsement 
                                                         
5
 Examples include the elimination of licensing fees on foreign representative offices in 1999, and towards the end 
of 2001, foreign firms no longer need to hire through local agencies. 
6
 Mechanisms include familiarization tours, formal and informal contacts amongst government officials, the 
constitution of ad-hoc problem-solving committees, and visits by ministerial delegations that emphasize the 




at the top has proved insufficient to secure equal commitment in the lower tiers of government. Thus, 
despite claims about Singapore’s politicians having achieved a special ‘guanxi’ (relationship) with China 
to secure the project’s success, when Singapore announced its reduced involvement in CS-SIP, Suzhou’s 
mayor nonchalantly pointed to the cultural divide between Singapore and China:  
 
“In our cooperation in the past five years, that we have an MOU to solve our problems is because 
of the cultural differences in the two countries, and the different understanding of the items in the 
documents …” 
                      - Chen Deming (quoted in The Straits Times, June 30, 1999). 
 
The practical significance here is that Singapore’s overseas parks tend to exist as investment enclaves 
within a disjointed economic and policy environment. They are linked to transnational investment 
networks, business elites and specific government commitments. The positive aspect of this is that the 
parks can be sites of investment privilege, in respect of their regulatory controls, infrastructure quality and 
status with public and private agencies. The weakness is that the privileges obtained are vulnerable to 
changes in political allegiance and the infrastructure efficiency is at risk from the uncontrolled broader 
environment in which the park is located. The mixed results of the `Singapore model’ in China and 
Vietnam illustrate this. Official commitment to the projects, however, remains7, as is the acceptance of an 
extended time horizon to meet development targets. To the extent that these R2000 projects maintain 
some ongoing momentum, and given their mixed economic and political objectives, a judgement of 
failure or success may not be appropriate. 
                                                         
7
 Source: Straits Times, July 2, 1999. Singapore’s International Advisory Council has endorsed this policy directive, 
and negotiations are at an advanced stage to develop Singapore-styled industrial parks in Shanghai and Beijing in 
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